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Perhaps with historical hindsight, 2008-2009 will be
remembered not for the Great Recession that first rocked the
U.S. residential mortgage credit market, then froze American
andglobalfinancialmarkets and eventually led to a worldwide
recession, but as an inflection pointfor world history, the U.S.
economy, and the legalprofession.
-Eli Wald'
I.

INTRODUCTION AND THESIS

In the shadows of economic collapse, banks may fail but the rule of law
remains strong. Few commentators deny the powerful relationship between the

I
Eli Wald, Symposium Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78
FoRDHAM L. REv. 2051, 2051 (2010) (citations omitted).
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economy and the law because the two worlds often collide to create prosperity,
opportunity, and justice. This Note, however, illustrates a strong correlation
between poor economies and recurring criticisms that current legal regulations
make legal services unavailable and too expensive. The unanswered question
then becomes whether economic reasons, alone, establish a sufficient basis to
deregulate the provision of legal services. Legal analysts believe that, in light of
the 2007 economic downturn, 2 the legal services industry will sustain
permanent decline. This Note challenges commentators to justify limitations
imposed by mandatory lawyer licensing, or alternatively, to outline a system of
reform that ensures unique protections otherwise offered by the organized bar.
Under traditional notions of American jurisprudence in which lawyers
practice law, the organized bar uses various tools to prevent non-lawyer
engagement in the unauthorized practice of law.4 However, critics of traditional
rules argue for deregulating legal services by abolishing unauthorized practice
of law ("UPL") restrictions.' These critics believe "that lawyer licensing limits
the availability of so-called legal services and increases the costs of services
that nonlawyers could provide as well."6
In addition to cost and access arguments, which make this topic
particularly relevant in the shadows of an economic recession, other pressures
accompanying an evolving profession challenge traditional notions of legal
services: increasing demand for legal services; rising competition among legal
service providers, lawyers and non-lawyers; changing regulations regarding
legal services; and other policy-related concerns, such as providing indigent
legal services.7 Overall, proponents of reform challenge the traditional
unauthorized practice regime, in response to increasing costs and limited access
to necessary legal services-factors especially relevant in poor economic times.

For a brief synopsis of the 2007 credit crisis and subsequent recession, see Richard D.
Cudahy, The Coming Demise ofDeregulationII, 61 ADMIN. L. REv. 543, 547-52 (2009).
See William Hornsby, Challenging the Academy to a Dual (Perspective): The Need to
Embrace Lawyeringfor PersonalLegal Services, 70 MD. L. REv. 420, 433 (2011) ("The impact
on the legal profession from the economic downturn that began in 2008 is unclear, but there is
speculation that legal services will see a long-term or permanent contraction.").
4
See Laurel A. Rigertas, Lobbying and Litigating Against "Legal Bootleggers "-The Role
of the Organized Bar in the Expansion of the Courts' Inherent Powers in the Early Twentieth
Century, 46 CAL. W. L. REv. 65, 66 (2009).
s
See Meredith Ann Munro, Note, Deregulationof the PracticeofLaw: Panaceaor Placebo,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 203, 203 (1990).
6
Fred C. Zacharias, Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual: Whither the
InstitutionsofRegulation and Discipline?,2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505, 1524 (2003).
7
See generally Quintin Johnstone, An Overview of the Legal Profession in the United States,
How That Profession Recently Has Been Changing,and Its Future Prospects, 26 QUINNIPIAc L.
REv. 737 (2008) (discussing the overview of recent changes to the legal profession and possible
long-term consequences).
2
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Again, traditional notions of the practice of law require as a condition
precedent that a practitioner be a lawyer before rendering legal services.
However, nothing about this premise is cut-and-dried in light of changing
societies and cyclical arguments to abolish such restrictions. Defining whom a
lawyer is and what becomes the practice of law can change the entire debate. In
other words, "who's in, who's out, and why[?]" 8 Now more than ever, the
answers to these questions matter in the wake of this Nation's most recent
economic recession9 because legal work impacts the economic fabric of this
Country's market economy.'o Despite the need for a quick fix for cheaper legal
services, "[t]he market for legal services is too important for so much of the
law as to who may participate in that market to remain indefinitely so
ambiguous, uncertain and unenforced.""
Continuing the long-time debate regarding licensed lawyers' control of
legal services,12 proponents of restrictive licensing requirements argue that
"limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against
the rendition of legal services by unqualified persons." 3 On the other hand,
8
Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalismin Perspective: Alternative Approaches to Nonlawyer
Practice, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHIcS 197, 197 (1996) ("No issue is more central to the
contemporary American legal profession than how to define itself as a profession: who's in,
who's out, and why.").
9
For a list of recessions in America since 1854, see US Business Cycle Expansions and
Contractions, NAT'L BUREAU OF EcoN. REs., http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last
visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter Expansions and Contractions]. See also Dan Barufaldi, A
Review
of
Past
Recessions,
Investopedia,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/economics/08/past-recessions.asp#axzz2NAdFFqT
(last
visited Mar. 10, 2013).
10 See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic
Cost of
ProfessionalControl Over CorporateLegal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1689, 1717 (2008).
"
Quintin Johnstone, UnauthorizedPracticeof Law and the Power of State Courts: Difficult
Problems and Their Resolution, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 795, 818 (2003).
12
Legal regulation and licensing is not a new debate:
Legal historians may ultimately treat the bar's unauthorized practice
campaign as both a product and a casualty of the Depression. The same
forces that gave rise to the bar's economic concerns generated a set of
governmental structures and societal adjustments that made the profession's
aspirations to monopoly increasingly anachronistic. As early as 1938, Karl
Llewellyn recognized that "some of these [lay] encroachments on the
practitioner's ancient fields are like the encroachments of the white man on
the Indian: neither right nor law, neither tradition nor stubborn fighting by
the gathered tribe, will over long hold up the disposition.
Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 97 (1981) (citations
omitted).
13
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5 cmt. 2 (2011); see also Jacqueline M. NolanHaley, Lawyers, Non-Lawyers and Mediation: Rethinking the Professional Monopoly From a
Problem-Solving Perspective, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 235, 260 (2002) (regulating lawyers'
conduct "offer[s] consumer protection as the rationale for UPL rules").
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proponents of reforming the American legal system for a less restrictive regime
argue that "a system with fewer restrictions on who will practice law will
reduce the costs of legal assistance and increase access to the judicial

system."l 4
My thesis addresses this tension: Economic pressure cannot legitimize
completely deregulating the American legal system because unique protections
enforced by an organized bar support the rule of law essential to our society.
Further, recognizing commentators' arguments regarding inevitable changes in
the law, I propose a framework of analysis which any reform must follow to
sustain protections otherwise provided by an organized bar.
The purpose of this Note is to highlight proponents' arguments for
deregulating the practice of law in poor economic times and provide an analysis
of why this single trigger is insufficient to completely abolish unauthorized
practice of law statutes. In Section II, I limit the scope of this Note to facilitate
a manageable debate regarding the much larger topic of regulating lawyers,
generally. In Section III.A, I highlight current statements by scholars and media
outlets arguing for less regulation of legal services. In Section III.B, I lay out
the historical rise of legal regulation in America followed by an analysis of
both sides of the regulation debate in Section III.C. In Section IV, I question
what the regulation debate is actually about, and Section V provides a set of
criteria that must accompany future reform efforts if the rule of law is to be
protected. Finally, if some reform is attained, Section VI questions the future of
the American legal system with less regulation.
This Note is not based on economic analyses regarding the cost-benefit
demand of licensed lawyers as it is beyond the scope of this work. Therefore,
the reader should approach this topic from a professional responsibility
perspective, recognizing that the inherent protections offered by an organized
bar cannot be abolished due to financial restraints, alone, without some other
substantial equivalent.
II. SCOPE
For purposes of this Note, I limit the scope of regulation to specific
areas of law, while discussing regulation as illustrated through unauthorized
practice of law restrictions. First, because critics cite increasing costs and
insufficient access to justify reforming legal services, this Note is limited to
legal services that low to middle-class consumers may forgo due to financial

14
Gary S. Moore, Lawyers and the ResidentialReal Estate Transaction, 26 REAL EST. L.J.
351, 362-63 (1998); see also CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT W. CRANDALL & VIKRAM MAHESHRI,
FIRST THINGS WE Do, LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS 95-99 (2011) (analyzing and
arguing in favor of deregulating legal services to address cost concerns and general inefficiencies
of occupational licensing).
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limitations.' 5 Generally, "[t]here is more litigation in the wake of [a] financial
crisis."1 6 As demand for legal services increases, specific types of litigation are
likely to recur during times of economic difficulty: foreclosures, domestic
relations, consumer issues, and other non-foreclosure housing matters."
Further, because more litigants represent themselves due to heavy financial
burdens, 8 this Note focuses on those legal services a consumer is likely to
waive due to limited resources.
Second, regulation in the context of this Note refers to state-based UPL
statutes. Recognizing the cost of limiting legal services, "important
determinants of the quality, availability[,] and costs of legal services in every
state are the state's unauthorized practice laws and how vigorously those laws
are enforced." 9 Therefore, states' unauthorized practice laws provide an
adequate cross-section of the debate surrounding deregulation of legal services
regarding prices and access. Restating my thesis, economic pressure cannot
legitimize completely deregulating the American legal system because unique
protections enforced by an organized bar support the rule of law essential to our
society.
III. BACKGROUND
A.

CurrentEfforts To "Deregulate": Relevance After the 2007 Recession

Following the sequence of historical recessions in the United States,
December 2007 marked the beginning of credit freezes and mortgage crises

See Rhode, supra note 8, at 209.
Richard W. Painter, Pro Se Litigation in Times of FinancialHardship-A Legal Crisis and
Its Solutions, 45 FAM. L.Q. 45, 45 (2011).
17
See id Extrapolated, this eliminates some criminal legal services; however, the scope of
this paper mostly eliminates the discussion regarding commercial legal consumers, whose
pockets may be deeper and less affected by economic pressure.
18 See Nathan Koppel, More StrappedLitigants Skip Lawyers in Court, WALL ST. J., July 22,
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052748704229004575371341507943822.html;
see also Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 268-69 (identifying a nexus between legal costs and pro
se representation); Painter, supra note 16, at 46; Christina L. Underwood, Balancing Consumer
Interests in a DigitalAge: A New Approach to Regulating the UnauthorizedPractice of Law, 79
1

16

WASH. L. REv. 437,442 (2004).

Ultimately, "legal rules" matter, and regulations governing lawyers likely impact the allocation
of legal services. According to Judge Richard Posner, "economic analysis [can] explain all of
law." George M. Cohen, When Law and Economics Met Professional Responsibility, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 273, 273-74 (1998).

19

Johnstone, supra note 11, at 850.
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sparking the Great Recession.2 0 In the wake of this recent recession and
consistent with previous times of economic hardship, critics vocalized their
opinions to deregulate the practice of law.
Some say, "First thing we do, let's deregulate all the lawyers."21 Others
say, "It's time to deregulate the practice of law," analyzing other industries that
have successfully done so. 2 2 Most poignantly, the question is posed: "What do
the New York Times, the Brookings Institution, and the Cato Institute have in
common? Turns out we agree on deregulating the legal profession." 2 3 For four
reasons, some of this Country's most influential players in politics and
scholarship reassert controversial arguments about the provision of legal
services: the relationship between economics and deregulation, an increased
need for legal services, the flexibility of UPL enforcement for specific areas of
practice, and continued issues with cost and access of legal services.
First, as outlined above, economic hardship triggers recurring
arguments to deregulate the practice of law. Legal services are considered
economic activity that contributes to the success of market economies.24 As
such, the demand for legal services clearly reflects changes in the economy. 2 5
Changing demand, as past recessions illustrate, may create "intraprofessional
competition" in addition to "external competition" from lay practitioners.2 6
In other words, economic instability presents opportunities for
reshaping the legal field as lawyers compete for business among themselves,
while competing against lay professionals who may practice in a certain
27
specialty. As such, the legal profession is experiencing a watershed moment
into the twenty-first century.28 Increasing competition, technology, and nonSee Catherine Rampell, "Great Recession": A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX
(Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-abrief-etymology/.
21
See generally WINSTON, CRANDALL, & MAHESHRI, supranote 14.
22
See Koppel, supra note 18.
20

23

Tim Lynch, Lawyers and Their Licenses, CATO INsT. (Aug. 24,
2011, 1:03 PM),

http://www.cato.org/blog/lawyers-their-licenses.
24
See Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1717; Johnstone, supra note 11, at 798-806 (discussing the
Competitive Market for Legal Services).
25
See George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High? The Case for Repealing Unauthorized
Practice of Law Statutes, REG., http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv20nl/reg20nlc.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
26
See Wald, supra note 1, at 2054.
27
See id; see also id at 2054 n.14 (citing Harry W. Arthurs & Robert Kreklewich, Law,
Legal Institutions, and the Legal Profession in the New Economy, 34 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1, 48
(1996)) ("stating that the legal profession continues to experience 'growing internal political
dissension at the very moment when it also confronts the profound and permanent external
challenges of the new economy"').
28
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342, 343 (2004).
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lawyer alternatives, such as dispute resolution, combine with economic
pressures that will certainly impact the future of legal services.29 Therefore,
because economic hardship often triggers arguments for reform, analyzing
current regulation of the law is relevant in light of America's most recent
recession.
Second, in response to the 2007 recession, demand for legal services in
America swelled. Litigation, generally, increases in the aftermath of a financial
crisis.30 Specifically, legal services germane to financial difficulty multiplied in
2010 as the nation remained within the shadows of financial hardship:
foreclosure, domestic relations, consumer issues, and housing matters other
than foreclosure, among others. 3 1 However, limited disposable income likely
limits individuals' ability to retain legal representation,32 and arguably pro se
litigation rates rise with financial strain. Disadvantaged without proper
representation, "[t]he economic downturn has left more Americans with the
daunting prospect of fighting court battles without a lawyer." 34 Layoffs, pay
cuts, bill collections, and other products of a recession likely limit consumers'
ability to pay for legal services. Limited funds increase pro se litigation,35 and
"[o]pening the door to lay-providers may also be a necessary reaction to the
growing, unsatisfied need of the poor and middle classes for law-related
,,36
services.
Third, the law governing unauthorized practice is already changing in
the twenty-first century. Primarily, practice of law definitions differ among
jurisdictions, 37 and varying interpretations directly affect the regulation of legal

See id at 355. However, it is interesting to note that most prior criticisms of lawyer
regulation followed major political and economic controversies. "The accusations sometimes
turn out to be inaccurate or only partially true, but some of the accusatory fingers usually point in
the direction of attorneys. And that's what makes the current economic mess-and the absence of
any blame for lawyers-so noteworthy." Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of
Attorneys' Loyalty to Clients, 40 ST. MARY'S L.J. 909, 919 n.26 (2009) (quoting Andrew
Perlman, The Biggest Legal Ethics Story of the Year?, LEGAL ETHICS FORUM (Oct. 5, 2008, 10:05
AM), http://legalethicsforum.typepad.com/blog/2008/10/the-biggest-leg.html)
(examining a
potentially distinguishing feature of criticisms of lawyers in this economic downturn, as opposed
to previous recessions explained below).
30
See Painter,supra note 16, at 45.
31
See id.
32
See Soha F. Turfler, Note, A Model Definition of the Practiceof Law: If Not Now, When?
An Alternative Approach to Defining the Practiceof Law, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1903, 190405 (2004).
3
See Nolan-Haley,supra note 13, at 268-69.
34
Koppel, supra note 18.
35
See Underwood,supra note 18, at 442.
36
Zacharias, supra note 6, at 1506.
3
See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 262.
29
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services. If certain practices fall outside a specific definition of the practice of
law, there can be no violation of unauthorized practice restrictions.
For example, courts define three separate tests to determine if a certain
act is the practice of law. The Professional Judgment Test analyzes whether an
activity requires specialized training and skills. 38 The Traditional Area of
Practice Test establishes a functionalist definition of exactly what lawyers do. 3 9
The Incidental Legal Services Test states that activities so routine in the
business or commercial setting are not defined as the practice of law. 4 0
Outlining these three tests illustrates the difficult task of defining and enforcing
unauthorized practice regimes, largely due to jurisdictions' authority to alter
regulations based on its definition of the practice of law.
Also, express exceptions to unauthorized practice restrictions
demonstrate a shift in regulating legal services. Most certainly, one has the
constitutional right to represent himself or herself in all cases, with or without a
law degree and bar admission.41 However, a minority of jurisdictions recognize
additional exceptions to unauthorized practice laws that allow non-lawyers to
practice work otherwise classified as legal work: cases where an attorney-client
relationship is absent, lay representation before administrative agencies and
small claims courts, law students practicing under supervisory authority, and
publishers' rights to publish do-it-yourself kits for consumers, among others.42
Therefore, varying definitions of the practice of law and exceptions to the
unauthorized practice rules suggest that traditional regulations are shifting,
especially relevant in uncertain economic times. 4 3
Last, the 2007 recession and other recessions, generally, ignited
reformists' criticisms that legal services are unavailable due to high costs of
representation. For example, criticisms of previous recessions reflect
contemporary commentary: "Rates are too high, inexperienced associates are
paid too much, processes are inefficient, and the overall cost of legal fees is
outrageous. Yet ... little has changed since the last recession ....
Commentators regularly criticize the cost and access of legal services,45 and it

3
39
40
41

See id at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id

See id. at 263-64 (citations omitted).
43
Anecdotally, the areas of highest UPL complaints include the following: employment
issues at administrative hearings, divorce, adoption, child support, insurance, real estate, and
mortgages cases. Id. at 265.
4
Gary R. Garrett, Will the Recovery Bring Changes to the Legal Services Business Model?,
09-8 L. OFF. MGMT. & ADMIN REP. 1 (2009).
45
See Roger C. Cramton, The Future of the Legal Profession: Delivery of Legal Services to
Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 531, 533-34 (1994) ("'The legal system' . .. is
42
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seems that the most recent recession once again revisits these arguments in
2012.
B.

Regulation: The RecurringDebate

1.

Current Arguments in Favor of Deregulation

The practice of law in America has been regulated for a long time, in
that non-lawyers are traditionally prohibited from practicing law and
individuals have the constitutionally recognized right to represent themselves.46
However, rules governing the practice of law developed neither quickly nor
without opposition.
In colonial America, a diverse group of individuals made up the legal
community, subject to few restrictions regarding the practice of law.4 7 During
this period, state statutes largely governed regulations dealing mostly with fees,
appearance restrictions, and oath requirements.48 Cases regarding the
unauthorized practice of law did not exist.49
After the American Revolution, many states' constitutions established
finite barriers among the three branches of government, but none expressly
demarcated control of the practice of law.o The result: some of the earliest
practice of law debates in America. To further shed ties with the British system,
legislators aimed to simplify the law and its processes to increase accessibility
for lay individuals.5 ' In response to anti-lawyer legislation, the legal profession
organized and formed the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1878 "to
advance the science of jurisprudence, promote the administration of justice and
uniformity of legislation throughout the Union."S2 Thereafter, state and local
bar organizations developed across the country and actively supported licensed
members, while challenging state attempts to steer the American practice of

'grossly inequitable and inefficient. There is far too much law for those who can afford it and far
too little for those who cannot."') (citations omitted).
46
See Johnstone, supra note 7, at 754.
47
See Margaret 0. Rentz, Note, Laying Down the Law: Bringing Down the Legal Cartelin
Real EstateSettlement Services and Beyond, 40 GA. L. REv. 293, 302-04 (2005).
48
Rigertas, supra note 4, at 77.
49
See id.
so
See id. at 77-82.
51

See id.

About
the
ABA,
AM.
BAR
Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/utility/
about the aba/timeline.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (slide the date bar all the way to the left
and select "FIRSTS: American Bar Association Forms"); see also Rigertas, supra note 4, at 7782. However, the American legal system transformed in the late nineteenth century when
Christopher Columbus Langdell served as Dean of Harvard Law School and put forth his idea of
law as a "science." See Rentz, supra note 47, at 304.
52
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law away from formalistic ideals of the British legal system. 3 Ultimately, state
bar associations facilitated the implementation of a standardized legal scheme,
which led to the creation of entrance requirements very common to a practicing
lawyer today: (1) a college graduation, (2) a law school graduation, (3) passing
the bar, and (4) passing the character and moral fitness analysis.54
Already, two differing camps emerged regarding access to the practice
of law: those favoring fewer restrictions and those supporting greater
restrictions. This debate set the stage for the ABA's first attempt at legislative
reform in the 1920s to prohibit the unauthorized practice of law by statute.
However, the ABA's movement failed due to legislative opposition, and stalled
temporarily. 56
The ABA regrouped in the 1930s and launched its second campaign to
counter unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers. After a short hiatus,
"[t]he bar's focus on the unauthorized practice of law did not experience a
major revival until after the beginning of the Great Depression."5 7 The strategy
during this second campaign differed from previous legislative efforts, focusing
on case-by-case litigation to enforce unauthorized practice restrictions instead
of statutory codification. 58
Instead of lobbying, lawyers litigated. Subsequent litigation centered
on courts' inherent power to regulate the practice of law, as vested within the
judiciary through states' constitutional separation of powers. 5 9 Authority also
stems from court rules, administrative regulations, and judicial opinions, in
addition to state constitutions, 6 0 creating a broad-based body of law that arms
state judiciaries with the inherent authority to manage state-specific legal
affairs.
Finally, in 1933, the ABA established the Standing Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law to investigate claims of unauthorized practice,
educate the legal community about the role of the ABA, and lobby for
unauthorized practice statutes at the state level.62 As a measure of success,

54
55

See Rigertas, supra note 4, at 82-103.
Rentz, supranote 47, at 304-05.
See Rigertas,supra note 4, at 66-67.

56

Id

57

Id. at 103.

58

See id at 68.

5

59

See id at 68-71.
See Todd M. Schild, To Each Its Own: State Decision-Making and the Residential Real
Estate Transaction,45 BRANDEIS L.J. 387, 390 (2007). Real estate transactions, for example, are
largely governed by state law. State statutes often enumerate "certain activities which constitute
the 'practice of law,' while . . . reserving for the judiciary the power . .. to determine which other
activities should be considered the 'practice of law."' Id.
61
See Turfler, supra note 32, at 1905 n. 11; see also Johnstone, supra note 11, at 823-30.
62
See Rentz, supra note 47, at 305.
60
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"[b]y 1940, at least 400 state and local bar associations had unauthorized
practice committees."63 Overall, the growing number of bar organizations has
proven instrumental in setting the stage for current unauthorized practice of law
debates regarding restrictive licensing requirements for legal services.
2.

Historical Intersection Between Economic Cycles and Calls for
Deregulation

Historic economic cycles and calls to deregulate the legal profession
are neither novel nor isolated. The perceived benefit of allowing lay
practitioners to represent an otherwise unrepresented population is not new.64
"However, this realization alone has never carried sufficient weight to force a
change . . . ."65 Though various motivations for legal restrictions invoke debate,
the reader must understand that a struggling economy translates to an
increasing demand for cheaper legal services, as discussed above. And this is
no surprise, because "a great deal of legal work is, and should be appreciated
as, economic activity that contributes to the effective functioning of a market

economy."66
Any comparison between American economic cycles and deregulation
likely begins with the Great Depression of August 1929. "Legal historians may
ultimately treat the bar's unauthorized campaign as both a product and a
casualty of the Depression. The same forces that gave rise to the bar's
economic concerns generated a set of government structures and societal
adjustments that made the profession's aspirations to monopoly increasingly
anachronistic." 67 Soon thereafter, legal scholar Karl Llewellyn observed the
tension between the lawyer's ancient practice and modern encroachment by lay
practitioners, which remains relevant today.68
The Great Depression serves as a logical starting point, as well,
because the ABA established the Standing Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law in 1933. As stated previously, the ABA established this
standing committee to investigate claims of unauthorized practice, educate the
legal community about the role of the ABA, and lobby for unauthorized

63
Id.; see also Johnstone, supra note 11, at 795-96 (defining state-specific UPL restrictions
based on individual states' constitutional authority).
64
See Zacharias,supra note 6, at 1525.
65
Id.
66
Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1717.
67
Rhode, supra note 12, at 97.
68
See id. "As early as 1938, Karl Llewellyn recognized that 'some of these lay
encroachments on the practitioner's ancient fields are like the encroachments of the white man on
the Indian: neither right nor law, neither tradition nor stubborn fighting by the gathered tribe, will
over long hold up the disposition."' Id. (citing K. N. Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and
Poultices-andCures?, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 104, 112 (1938)).
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practice statutes at the state level. 6 9 Furthermore, the post-Depression shift
occurred during the ABA's second wave of attempts to increase restrictions on
lay competition offering legal services-the shift from lobbyist to litigator.70 In
light of these developments, August 1929 marks the beginning point of
research and analysis for period-specific calls to deregulate the law and/or
criticisms that lay practitioners should reap some benefits of the practice of
law.
The National Bureau of Economic Research defines a recession as "a
significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, lasting
more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income,
employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales." 7' From the
Great Depression until today, the United States has endured fourteen periods of
economic recession from the Great Depression of August 1929 until the Great
Recession of December 2007.72 Throughout these periods of economic decline,
Americans had less money to spend on legal services and calls to deregulate the
profession sustained through each economic trough. A timeline of periodspecific examples is discussed below.
Unauthorized practice regulations and American economic cycles are
related. Measured since the mid-19th century, and presumably before, the
American economy periodically experiences a "significant decline in economic
activity" that affects peoples' everyday lives: income, jobs, politics, and
others.73 At the same time, arguments for deregulating the legal framework
sustain through these economic cycles as high costs and limited access to legal
services remain relevant for many Americans. Therefore, a fair argument
highlights the intersection between the economy and the law-related through
individuals' ability to afford legal services. More specific to the thesis of this
Note, failed reform over previous decades reaffirms the history of American
economics that financial motivations, alone, cannot justify complete
deregulation of legal services without alternative means to impose current
duties and obligations of the organized bar upon lay practitioners.
As previously stated, the Great Depression of August 1929 established
a beginning point for rising tension between lawyers and lay practitioners.
After the Great Depression, subsequent litigation demarcated the point of
formal attempts to quell non-lawyer practice, establish a formal UPL oversight
committee, and maintain lawyers' traditional control of legal services. Shortly
after the Great Depression, scholars reflected on the tension between lawyers
and non-lawyers. "Despite such clear prohibitions, many unlicensed individuals

69
70

n

See Rentz, supra note 47, at 305.
See Rigertas, supra note 4, at 68.
See Expansions and Contractions,supra note 9.

72

See id.

7

See id
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and organizations are today performing functions heretofore commonly
regarded as within the exclusive province of the lawyer." 74 Furthermore, in
light of state court decisions upholding strict lawyer licensing restrictions,
lawyers are likely to protest any encroachment by lay practitioners. 75 These
court decisions "may prompt many individuals to ask why there should be a
professional monopoly in the practise [sic] of law."76 Post-Great Depression,
"encroachment" by lay practitioners likely came from one of three areas: trade
associations, collection agencies, or title and trust companies.n
Shortly after the recession of May 1937, commentators revisited the
debate regarding lawyer licensing. "The problem of unauthorized practice of
the law is a problem of using the processes of the law to define and protect a
monopoly." 7 Professor Llewellyn also discusses the role of laymen and a
potential non-lawyer skill set that may be just as capable as the skills of
lawyers. 79 From the perspective of a scholar already entrenched in the academy
and practice of law, Llewellyn does not criticize the bar for its restrictions. He
simply warns that the bar must be aware of and ready to justify its position on
the "relation between the Bar and the work which the Bar seeks to do."80
In the wake of the February 1945 recession, commentators again
identified jurisdictional disputes between lawyers and other professionals doing
similar work, e.g., income tax practice, among others. In light of recent
litigation involving accountants and the practice of law, courts likely ask a
series of questions. The first question asks "what right the legal profession may
lay claim to social protection of its monopoly as against lay intruders." 82 The
second question addresses whether the violator's "conduct could be considered
to constitute the practice of law," if unauthorized practice restrictions are
justified.8 3 Finally, the third question asks "whether the service in question is
such that the public interest requires a particular skill possessed only by the
trained lawyer, and a standard of personal responsibility which the lawyer alone

74
Frederick C. Hicks & Elliot R. Katz, The PracticeofLaw by Laymen andLay Agencies, 41
YALE L.J. 69, 70 (1931).
7
See E. Smythe Gambrell, Lay Encroachments on the Legal Profession, 29 MICH. L. REv.
989,991 (1931).
76
Id at 989.

See id. at 991.
Llewellyn, supra note 68, at 104.
7
See id at 106-07.
so
Id. at 109.
8
See generally Note, Attorney Versus Accountant: A ProfessionalJurisdictionalDispute in
the Field of Income Tax Practice, 56 YALE L.J. 1438 (1947) [hereinafter Attorney vs.
Accountant].
82
Id. at 1442.
7

78

83

See id
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can guarantee."84 For all of these questions, the burden rests on bar
organizations to illustrate the necessity of complete control by lawyers.
After the 1957 recession, courts further addressed the unauthorized
practice of law by businesses on behalf of clients regarding matters closely
related to principle business matters, e.g., a bank drafting probate documents. 6
Subsequent case law held that three requirements were necessary for any entity
to practice law: sound moral character, adequate learning, and subjection to the
canons of ethics and the control of the courts. 87 The role of the independent bar
is important to ensure that the better-educated members of society take leading
roles.88 However, lay individuals should not be foreclosed per se if they can
protect the central tenets of practicing law and the advantage of lay services is
substantial.89 This commentary reaffirms the importance of an independent bar,
but warns that a "re-investigation" regarding the public's demand for the
method of delivery for legal services is warranted. 90
After the July 1981 recession, the deregulation movement became quite
vocal with reformists' efforts to abolish restrictions on the unauthorized
practice of law. 91 Critics proclaimed, "dismantle the legal monopoly!, 92 or
"relinquish the barricades," 93 rebuking costly legal services and related
inaccessibility. Extremist critics further expressed that UPL restrictions were no
longer defensible, at all, because these "lawyerly" values only benefitted
lawyers' self-interest. 94 The more reasonable view, however, states that no
profession can usurp power and authority without some justification of costs
imposed on society as the result of limited opportunity-"No profession can
stretch its jurisdiction infinitely." 95 The profession, again, has the burden of
proof.
Finally, after the March 2001 recession, critics charged that organized
professions and ethical rules are "products" of market control, presumably

Id. at 1443.
8
Id at 1448.
86
See Note, The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law by Lay OrganizationsProvidingthe Services
ofAttorneys, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1334-35 (1959).
8
See id at 1334.
88
See id at 1347.
89
See id at 1348.
90
See id at 1349.
9
See Munro, supra note 5, at 203.
92
Id. (citations omitted).
84

93

Id.

See Hadfield,supra note 10, at 1691-92 (citations omitted).
Ronen Shamir, Professionalism and Monopoly of Expertise: Lawyers and Administrative
Law, 27 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 361, 371 (1993) (citations omitted).
94
9
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created to secure some control on the consumer market. 9 6 "It is no surprise,
critics charge, that in the latest assault on the monopoly of the American legal
profession . . . lawyers are hiding behind their ethics rules to protect their

turf."9 7 In response, the Author admits that lawyers exercise monopolistic
control over legal services. 98 However, the lawyers' monopoly is necessarily
justified based on a unique set of skills and rigorous fiduciary obligations
protecting courts and consumers, as explained below.
These historical illustrations criticizing legal regulations do not exhaust
the vast body of scholarship on this subject. However, the intersection between
the economy and deregulation is clear. Critics began protesting the current
regime of UPL enforcement after the Great Depression, and these criticisms
against licensing and bar membership continue to this day. During this period,
the United States endured fourteen economic recessions that further enhanced
critics' arguments that legal services are inaccessible due to high costs.
However, at no point during this period did economic hardship prove
substantial enough to justify abolishing completely all UPL restrictions and
open all legal services to all lay practitioners. With this assertion in mind, the
next logical question asks why this intersection between economics and
deregulation remains relevant today.
3.

Current Unauthorized Practice of Law Regime

Based on early successes of bar organizations, unauthorized practice of
law statutes are prevalent in every American jurisdiction. States' authority to
regulate the practice of law "is a patchwork of legal rules and concepts from a
variety of sources: court rules, statutes, administrative regulations, judicial
opinions, and [state constitutions]." 99 Furthermore, in each jurisdiction,
unauthorized practice restrictions impact a number of special interests,
including lawyers, judges, consumers, non-legal competitors, law schools, and
others.'0 0 Each of these unauthorized practice statutes prohibits legal service
providers from practicing law without bar membership in that jurisdiction.'01
However, because the unauthorized practice of law is predominantly a field of

See Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the
PracticeofLaw andReal Life, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87, 87 (2003).
97
Id
96

See id. at 87-88.
Johnstone, supra note 11, at 806.
100 See generally Johnstone, supra note 7 (applying regulatory debate to consumers, nonlawyer competitors, lawyers, judges, law schools, bar associations, and legal service providers
such as law firms and legal aid).
101 See Leef, supra note 25, at I (stating the prerequisites for bar membership).
90

9
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state law,102 the definition and enforcement of legal services provided by nonlawyers varies by jurisdiction.
Practitioners need a common definition of the practice of law to solve
the greater debate surrounding the unauthorized practice of law. 0 3
Understanding this debate is two-fold: the practice of law depends upon what
activities constitute legal services, and the unauthorized practice of law
depends upon who, or which practitioner, can provide those legal services.' 04
As shown below, varying definitions and enforcement of unauthorized practice
restrictions prompted many commentators' support for a more uniform
approach-which has never been achieved.'os
First, each state independently defines the practice of law.1 06
Jurisdictions struggle to assess the practice of law beyond a general definition
because whether or not a practitioner's services constitute the practice of law is
highly fact-specific. 0 7 Reaching consensus about the practice of law is
critically important to the deregulation debate because if a particular service
does not constitute the practice of law, the debate is over. "[T]he real culprit in
the enormous increase in the cost of legal services is the more subtle dynamic
of how the content of legal products is defined." 08 Unauthorized practice of
law restrictions only limit those services that a jurisdiction has deemed the
practice of law, and the debate of unauthorized services is secondary to
defining the practice of law.109 Vague practice of law definitions muddy
distinctions between authorized and unauthorized practices of law, particularly
in those industries where lay practitioners are deemed to be practicing law." 0
Second, once consumer services rise to the level of practicing law,
unauthorized practice provisions "prevent those who are not admitted to the bar

102
103

'"
105
106

See Johnstone, supranote 11, at 795.
See Turfler, supranote 32, at 1908-09.

See id. at 1911.
See generally id.
See generally ABA TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF
THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
available at
OF
THE
PRACTICE
OF
LAW,
A:
STATE
DEFINITIONS

APPENDIX

http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/modeldef/model-defstatutes.authche
ckdam.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2013) (listing state-specific definitions and schemes regarding
the unauthorized practice of law citing relevant authority from each state).
107
See Underwood,supra note 18, at 444-45.
108
Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1695.
109 See Cramton, supra note 45, at 544 ("Prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law
prevent those who are not admitted to the bar in each state from engaging in the 'practice of
law.'").
110 For example, real estate transactions may constitute the practice of law based on statespecific and fact-specific scenarios; conducting closings, document preparation, offering advice,
or other activities may constitute the unauthorized practice of law if performed without a license
to practice law. See generally Schild, supra note 60.
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in each state from engaging in the 'practice of law.'""' Most generally, "[t]he
unauthorized practice of law is the practice of law by a person, generally a nonlawyer, who lacks authorization to practice in a given jurisdiction."ll 2
Practitioners must meet all requirements to practice law in a certain
jurisdiction." 3 Failure to comply with these requirements is held to be the
unauthorized practice of law, without some exception for non-lawyer
participation in certain areas of the law.1 4 In general, violating a state's
unauthorized practice rules often results in civil and/or criminal penalties,
depending on the rules and enforcement in each jurisdiction.' 5
Deregulation occurs when unauthorized practice restrictions are
abolished, which allows unlicensed, lay practitioners to offer legal services
without fear of penalty.1 6 Today, many states actively enforce unauthorized
practice rules; however, the future of these restrictions is arguably uncertain." 7

I"
Cramton, supra note 45, at 544; see also Rhode, supra note 12, at 29 (discussing examples
of UPL complaints).
112 Underwood, supra note 18, at 443.
113
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4 (2000).
114 For example, the California State Bar established the Public Protection Committee to study
the unauthorized practice of law and the feasibility of future deregulation. See Munro, supra note
5, at 220-25. The committee recognized the potential harm imposed by non-lawyer "legal
technicians" but could not come to any form of deregulation greater than allowing registered lay
practitioners to practice in a few "lower-to-mid level[]" areas: landlord-tenant, immigration,
family law, and bankruptcy. Id.

115

See generally ABA STANDING COMM. ON CLIENT PROT., 2009 SURVEY OF UNLICENSED

PRACTICE
OF
LAW
COMMITTEES
(March
2009),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/clientpro/09_uplsurvey.authcheckda
m.pdf (surveying, in 2009, a majority of states' definition and enforcement of the unauthorized
practice of law).
116 See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 259-60.
The UPL doctrine limits the practice of law to licensed attorneys who have
satisfied educational and moral requirements. Every state regulates the
unauthorized practice of law by statute, case law, or a combination of both.
Unauthorized practice rules apply both to non-lawyers and to attorneys who
are not licensed to practice in a particular state or who assist non-lawyers in
the unauthorized practice of law. UPL enforcement methods vary and may
rest with bar associations, supreme court committees or civil and criminal
law enforcement through the attorney general or prosecutor's office....
[R]emedies may take the form of injunction, criminal prosecution, criminal
contempt, and quo warranto writs.
Id.
117 See generally Zacharias, supra note 6 (analyzing likely changes in professional
responsibility in the twenty-first century); see also Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis
of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation-Courts, Legislatures, or the
Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1247-49 (2003) (outlining the current scheme of lawyer

regulation, entry regulation and conduct regulation, as managed by state supreme courts and/or
powers delegated to state bar associations).
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The quid pro quo"' justifying current restrictions may be inadequate to prevent
non-lawyers' practice in an evolving legal profession-for which the current
deregulation debate relies upon the applicability of traditional unauthorized
practice provisions. Like the practice of law, if a practitioner is authorized to
perform the services that he or she renders, the debate is over.
Though jurisdictions may disagree about the scope and enforcement of
practice restrictions, proponents' arguments for UPL limitations apply
universally. Broadly speaking, "Different legal restrictions or exemptions
imposed by unauthorized practice laws may have different objectives, but ...
[likely] have one or both of these goals: protecting consumers from
incompetent or unethical legal service providers; or assuring a market for
[sufficient] legal services . . . at a reasonable price."" 9 At a basic level,
proponents of practice restrictions assume that licensed attorneys satisfy basic
educational and moral benchmarks. 12 0 The preceding, however, is only one side
of the debate, and a proper analysis of deregulating legal services must balance
competing policies: protecting consumers from unqualified and unethical
practitioners versus ensuring access to legal services.121
C.

The Debate Surrounding the Guild ofLawyers

The legal profession is unique in that one must be a lawyer to practice
law.12 2 In other fields, such as the medical profession, legislatures regulate
professionals according to various levels of training and corresponding costs to
consumers based on level of expertise.12 3 Restrictions governing legal services
are self-regulated by powerful bar organizations,12 4 not legislatures, which
restrict who can practice law and which services may be offered.125 Such
restrictions, predictably, initiate intense debate.
See Cohen, supra note 18, at 291 ("Professional responsibility has long recognized the quid
pro quo of a limited monopoly for the legal profession in return for an undertaking of various
social obligations.").
Johnstone, supranote 11, at 807-08.
119
120
See Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 259; see also Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing
UnauthorizedPracticeof Law Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and
Its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 725 (2007) ("Comment two
to Model Rule 5.5 states that the purpose of the rule is to protect 'the public against rendition of
legal services by unqualified persons."' (citations omitted)).
121
See Rhode, supra note 8, at 197.
122
See Derek A. Denckla, Responses to the Conference: Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized
Practice ofLaw: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters,67 FORDHAM L. REv. 258 1,
2581 (1999) ("In every state, nonlawyers are generally prohibited from practicing law, deemed
the 'unauthorized practice of law."').
123
See Rigertas, supranote 4, at 71.
124
Johnstone, supra note 7, at 784-85.
125
Hadfield, supra note 10, at 1714.
118
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Proponents of licensing regimes argue that the public interest is best
served if innocent consumers are necessarily protected from incompetent and
fraudulent practitioners.1 26 On the other hand, critics of current unauthorized
practice laws believe that increased consumer choice and heightened
competition will best serve the public interest.127 Furthermore, critics argue that
self-regulated restrictions provide little utility other than satisfying lawyers'
self-interest at others' expense.12 8 But even if this latter assertion is true,
practice restrictions are likely justified by the inherent protections of the
organized bar, and economic arguments fail to justify complete deregulation
without a substantially equivalent mechanism to sustain current duties binding
lawyers' commitment to the rule of law.
1.

Criticisms of Current Regulation

Critics of unauthorized practice restrictions may be heard chanting,
"The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers."1 2 9 Advocates for legal reform
believe that abolishing current regulations will likely reduce costs of legal
services and better accommodate consumer choice.o30 Again, posing these
questions during poor economic periods is particularly effective when low-tomiddle-income households forgo legal services due to heavy costs of
representation.131 Amidst scholarship and recent arguments for reshaping the
legal institution, proponents of reform support their position with four
arguments: the cost and access of legal services, the lack of empirical support
for current restrictions, an unjustified monopoly of legal services, and an
increasing competition from lay practitioners.
First, and most relevant to the comparison between economic cycles
and deregulating legal services, reformists argue that legal services are
inaccessible due to high transaction costs. For many individuals, "The legal
system ... [is] grossly inadequate and inefficient. There is far too much law for

126

See Rentz, supra note 47, at 300-01.

127

See id.

128
See Eli Wald, An Unlikely Knight in Economic Armor: Law and Economics in Defense of
Professional Ideals, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 1042, 1047 (2001) ("[Professional] ideals are
critiqued as a tool at the hands of professionals aimed at increasing lawyers' self-interest at the
expense of their clients and the public.").
129
Frank B. Cross, Essay, The First Thing We Do, Let's Kill All The Economists: An
Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United States Economy and Political
System, 70 TEX. L. REv. 645, 653 n.39 (1992) (citations omitted).
130
See Rhode, supranote 8, at 211; see also id. at 197 (When neighbors asked a New England
farmer whether his livestock was purchased for a good price, he said, "[w]ell I didn't get what I
thought I would but then I knew I wouldn't.").
131 See Rentz, supra note 47, at 296.
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those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot."1 32 Scholars
argue further that providing some alternative means of legal representation
could provide legal services to the poor and middle classes at a reasonable cost
and quality.133 Put simply, "[M]illions of consumers cannot pay lawyers' bills
without real sacrifice." 3 4
Also, reformists argue that a free market system is well-equipped to
stoke competition, drive down fees, and increase consumer choice in legal
services.135 However, UPL proponents offer rebuttal: "Legal services, however,
are unlike products that are freely traded on the market[,]" in that legal services
cannot readily be tested for value.13 6 Ultimately, reformists argue that the
availability of legal services depends on the availability of funding.'37
Expensive legal services result in large segments of the population without
counsel, or if they are represented, the representation often proves
inadequate. 138
Second, reformists argue that UPL proponents have no empirical basis
on which to rest their arguments for regulation to protect against harm by nonlawyers. "Hypotheses alone are an insufficient basis for restricting competition
in a way that is likely to harm consumers." 39 Admittedly, there are certain
difficulties in justifying a legal services monopoly, also known as the lawyers'
monopoly, without adequate evidence of actual or potential harm from lay
competition.140 However, the logical rebuttal would be that the public interest is
too important to wait until harm has already been done, and arguing
hypothetically is appropriate due to the high stakes of protecting the rule of
law. Nonetheless, any empirical evidence on lay competition illustrates that, in
certain areas, there is little qualitative difference and proof of harm when lay
individuals have completed "legal work."l41 In fact, "[m]any individuals who
retained lawyers were paying large sums for routine work that could readily
have been done (and often was done) by nonlawyer assistants without
substantial supervision." 4 2

132

Cramton, supra note 45, at 533-34 (citations omitted).

133

See id at 534.
Rhode, supranote 8, at 208-09.

134

3s
136

137
138

See Munro, supra note 5, at 217.
Id. at 234.
See Johnstone, supranote 7, at 771-72.
See id at 770-71.

Joyce D. Palomar, The War Between Attorneys and Lay Conveyancers-Empirical
Evidence Says "Cease Fire!", 31 CoNN. L. REv. 423, 431 (1999).
140 See Johnstone, supranote 11, at
816.
141 Rentz, supra note 47, at 323-24.
142

Rhode, supra note 8, at 200.
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Third, proponents of reform argue that bar associations monopolize the
industry for legal services and unfairly foreclose others' opportunities to offer
these services. Generally, occupational licensing may be justified when the
proper balance between economic freedom and societal protection has been
metl 4 3-though
it may be "difficult to say when licensing of certain
occupations can be justified based on quality-consideration."1 4 4 Occupational
licensing may yield high quality outcomes through education and training
requirements, and licensing likely encourages higher investment in human
capital, like a law degree. 14 5 However, studies show that licensing imposes a
fifteen percent wage premium on professions requiring occupational licensing,
resulting in higher unemployment, higher consumer prices, and lower
employment growth rates.14 6
In sum, there is a "strong presumption in economics that occupations
licensing is a form of cartel activity that restrains trade to the disadvantage of
consumers and the public."l 47 Specific to legal services, occupational licensing
is most stringent for lawyers, and many commentators suggest that industry
controls impose an unjustifiable guild-like cartel motivated solely by selfinterest.14 8 Even if the issue is narrowly tailored to address whether or not the
legal profession can satisfy its burden in justifying practice restrictions,14 9
critics argue that proponents fall short.

143
See MORRIs M. KLEINER, UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP'T RESEARCH, POLICY PAPER No. 2011-009,
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC INTEREST OR PROTECTIONISM? I (July 2011),

available
at
http://research.upjohn.org/cgilviewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context
uppolicypapers (analyzing the tension between special interests and the public with regard to
regulations upon occupations through licensing).
144
Id. at 4.
145 See id.
146 See id. at 2.
147 Cramton, supra note 45, at
551.
148 See Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J.
1, 1-2 (1993)
(explaining the legal profession as a restrictive cartel, and analyzing the under-appreciated
intersection between cartel theory and jurisprudence); see also Leef, supra note 25, at 2.
149
See Wald, supra note 29, at 912. Further distinguishing the role of lawyers and the Bar's
unique position to regulate:
To be clear, lawyers' responsibilities and duties to the rule of law are not
merely the "price" the legal profession must pay for the privilege of
exercising a monopoly over the provision of legal services. In other words, it
is not as if the legal profession receives a monopoly over the provision of
legal services so it could be responsible for the rule of law. Rather, pursuant
to the social bargain, lawyers as professionals are uniquely positioned
because of their esoteric knowledge not only to self-regulate but also to
safeguard the rule of law. This is better thought of not as the "price" for
exercising a monopoly, but rather as the source of the obligation that, to
follow our metaphor, distinguishes the Bar from the case of truck drivers and
the road.
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Finally, reformists' fourth argument highlights the availability of lay
practitioners to complete routine legal work or provide specialized legal
services unfamiliar to generalist lawyers. For example, lay competitors include
accountants, real estate brokers, insurance representatives, and other industry
professionals.' One argument in favor of lay practitioners is that many legal
transactions require little more than filing forms. For many routine legal needs,
such as routine divorces, landlord-tenant disputes, bankruptcy, immigration,
welfare claims, tax preparation, and real estate transactions, "retaining lawyers
is like hiring 'a surgeon to pierce an ear.'",st
The other argument is that consumers are better served by specialized
professionals instead of generalist lawyers. "Three years in law school and
passage of a bar exam is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure competence
in areas where lay provision of services is common."l 52 The logical rebuttal is
that, in certain areas, especially, legal issues present hidden problems and may
uncover other issues.' 53 A trained lawyer, with at least a basic level of training
and duty to the client will likely minimize the inherent risks of a lay
practitioner. However, proponents of reform correctly argue that many lay
practitioners provide quality services that yield little or no qualitative
difference.15 4 In light of changing regulations affecting legal services,' 55 "[T]he
bar's best interest ultimately lies in constructively assisting the process, not in
trying to prevent it."' 56 Without a doubt, critics' calls to deregulate the practice
of law have merit and rise above academic rhetoric. The regulation of law
under its current regime, however, is justified and provides necessary oversight
to protect consumers, as outlined below.
2.

Supporters of Current Regulation

Proponents of unauthorized practice restrictions believe that
jurisdictions must have the authority to oversee legal practitioners and deter

Id at 962; see also infra note 171 (explaining the analogy between the duties of truck drivers and
lawyers).
Iso
1s1
152

See Rhode, supra note 8, at 206.
Id. (citation omitted).
id

1
See Michael C. Ksiazek, The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Unauthorized
Practice ofLaw: Justificationfor Restricting Conveyancing to Attorneys, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
169, 177 (2004). Advocates of regulation argue that "layperson conveyancers inherently fail to
recognize and account for complicated issues only the trained lawyer is adequately capable of
spotting, disclosing, and managing." Id
154 See Munro, supra note 5, at 218.
155
See Rhode, supranote 8, at 204.
156
id

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/14

22

Bush: From the Great Depression to the Great Recession: (Non-)Lawyers P
2013]

FROM THE GREATDEPRESSION TO THE GREAT RECESSION

1207

unqualified individuals from practicing law.'57 Without such institutionalized
protections, "no effective sanction and deterrence system will be available,"
which translates into devastating effects on the availability and quality of legal
services. 58 Despite any potential economic benefits of deregulation, these
advantages are not likely to counter overarching concerns for consumer
protection.159 Arguments for deregulation likely do not rebut the presumption
that "[1]awyers play a vital role in the preservation of society."l 60
Restricting the unauthorized practice of law shields unknowing
consumers from incompetent or unethical practitioners. Proponents worry that
harm inevitably results from ineffective legal assistance and too few
enforcement tools for non-lawyer accountability.' 6 ' Further, "[t]he American
Bar Association feels that prohibiting laymen from practicing law protects the
public from ineffective assistance."l62 Sufficient legal representation requires
an understanding of the complexity of all issues hidden and apparent, a proper
scope of representation with the client and reasonable expectations, and certain
duties to protect the clients' interests.163
Critics argue that the "lawyerfication" of American society hinders
economic growth and development by imposing higher fees and increasing
litigation.164 However, the more plausible argument is that in the absence of
any licensed counsel, "an economy without lawyers would function far less
efficiently than an economy with lawyers . . . '[L]aw is essential to construct

and operate even the 'free' market.'" 65 Furthermore, it is likely that the
perceived benefits of abolishing UPL restrictions cannot justify deregulating
the law: fee differences may not be substantial enough to scrap law restrictions;
society-at-large is certainly at an informational disadvantage to make informed
legal decisions; and other externalities, such as eroding legal aid services, may
occur if lawyers are no longer bound by professional duties.16 6 Because
effective assistance necessarily protects the rule of law and perceived benefits
of deregulation are likely insignificant, restricting lay practitioners in the name
of protecting the public interest is justified.
In support of this position, UPL proponents argue that the following
arguments protect the public interest: proper authority to regulate and
15 See Hoppock, supranote 120, at 728.
15

See id.

159

See Underwood, supra note 18, at 438.

160

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl.

161

See Moore, supra note 14, at 363.
id

162
163

See Underwood, supra note 18, at 440.

164
165

See Cross, supra note 129, at 650-51.

166

See Munro, supra note 5, at 226-40.

1

13 (2011).

Id.
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justification of regulatory rules; quality legal services protecting consumers and
courts; inherent protections of the rules; and the failure of historical arguments
to deregulate based solely on economic concern.
First, bar organizations' authority to regulate the practice of law is
legitimized by state constitutions and historical common-law. At the outset,
regulating the practice of law falls within states' authority, which often delegate
regulation of the legal profession to state judiciaries and bar associations. 16In
other words, the unauthorized practice of law is not a federal issue, and each
jurisdiction, by way of state-specific constitutions, is free to establish its own
unauthorized practice restrictions.168 UPL restrictions are "traditionally asserted
by the courts and legislature as being the protection of both the public and
judicial system . .. [from] practitioners who are not subject to educational and
ethical restraints."1 69 Because of lawyers' skills and fiduciary duties that result
from a self-imposed monopoly, lawyers are in the best position to regulate the
rule of law and deal with the unauthorized practice of law.1 70 This distinguishes
lawyers from other professions.17 1
In addition to legal justification, unauthorized practice enforcement is
economically justifiable. The overall cost of legal services is not necessarily
disproportionate with clients' expectations or the actual value of those
services,17 2 and there is no question that lawyers' services facilitate the overall
development of wealth. 17 3 Although an alternative system of legal services may
be possible, no alternative form of regulation is currently in place, and there is

See Zacharias,supranote 6, at 1509.
168 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. c (2000)
("The
highest courts in most states have ruled as a matter of state constitutional law that their power to
regulate lawyers is inherent in the judicial function.").
169
Munro, supranote 5, at 207-08.
170
See Wald, supra note 29, at 961-62. The legitimacy of the self-imposed monopoly is
defended below, in large part because the rule of law must be protected. Because lawyers have
the requisite tools to regulate lawyers getting licenses and then keeping those licenses, and
because no other system currently exists to fill the void inevitably left by abolishing bar
associations' regulation of the unauthorized practice of law, current regulations are justified.
171 For example, the duties of truck drivers and lawyers are
analogous. Truck drivers, too,
have a duty to their "client," the employer, to deliver goods safely, in addition to other duties
such as driving professionally, etc. However, truck drivers have no express obligation to maintain
the roads on which they travel, but lawyers do. Lawyers are obligated to maintain the rule of law.
See id.
172
See Deborah L. Rhode, Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: Too Much Rhetoric, Too Little
Reform, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 989, 1000-06 (1998) (highlighting arguments surrounding the
oft-cited criticism of costly legal services).
173 See Cross, supra note 129, at
651.
167
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no guarantee that any alternative would be more efficient than a system
including lawyers.' 7 4
Second, UPL proponents argue that limiting unlicensed legal services
ensures a basic level of competency to protect qualitative concerns of
consumers and courts. The Bar recognizes its "dark secret" that restrictive
regulations and requirements do not necessarily ensure that all lawyers are
equally competent in all areas of the law.' 7 ' However, licensed attorneys at
least guarantee a minimum level of education and ethical standards, "whereas
non-lawyers are not regulated 'as to integrity or legal competence."'l 76 From
judges' own experience, individuals proceeding without a lawyer are
disadvantaged by the following: failure to present necessary evidence,
procedural errors, ineffective witness examination, failure to object properly,
and ineffective argument.177
Further, advocates for unauthorized practice restrictions argue that the
rule of law also relies upon protecting courts' interests. Identifying broader
concerns, "[T]he public well-being is not the sole area of concern [regarding
licensing restrictions]. The efficient and fair administration of justice must also
be protected."' 78 Courts' interests include two scenarios: (1) an individual
proceeding without a lawyer and (2) an advocate's lack of candor to the court.
If an individual represents himself or is represented by inadequate counsel,
likely due to financial limitations, courts suffer: proceedings are slower, more
court staff is required, facts are twisted, courts may compromise impartiality,
and juries and judges are more susceptible to improper decisions based upon
the insufficient development of an individual's case.' 79 In addition,
representation by a non-lawyer increases the chances of incompetency
regarding rules of evidence, procedure, and common law precedent, in addition

See id. at 652. For purposes of argument, any proponent of current regulations must
concede that unauthorized practice statutes may not be the only way to protect the rule of law.
For comparison, Justice Warren stated in Miranda v. Arizona that the "Miranda warning" was not
the sole vehicle to protect individuals' right against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). However, without some other substantial equivalent formulated by
legislatures and courts, officers must recite the familiar Miranda warning: "[U]nless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following safeguards must
be observed." Id. at 467-68. Like Miranda, enforcing unauthorized practice statutes, without
some other substantial equivalent, not only make sense but are required.
175 See Zacharias,supra note 6, at 1522.
176
Nolan-Haley, supra note 13, at 261; see also Benjamin H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate
Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the JustificationforEntry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 429, 430 (2001).
177
See Painter,supra note 16, at 46.
Shane L. Goudey, Too Many Hands in the Cookie Jar: The UnauthorizedPractice ofLaw
'
by Real EstateBrokers, 75 OR. L. REv. 889, 893 (1996).
179
Painter, supra note 16, at 46.
174
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to lack of discipline and candor to the court.180 Therefore, the logical
conclusion is that the organized bar is in the best position to objectively balance
consumer needs versus legal qualifications, again ensuring quality legal workproduct to protect the public interest.18 ' Non-lawyers affect the administration
of justice, which is another important obligation imposed upon licensed
lawyers.
Third, licensing requirements provide a mechanism for enforcing
inherent professionalism found in the law governing lawyers.' 82 Membership in
a bar association, as required by UPL restrictions, requires that a licensed
lawyer be bound by rules of professional responsibility. The ABA publishes the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to guide and support state bar
organizations, which exercise ultimate authority for implementing and
enforcing state-based rules governing lawyers.1 83 The Model Rules provide
inherent protections that lawyers must uphold as individuals and
practitioners-obligations that bind no other profession.' 84 For example, "A
lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for
the quality of justice."' 8 5 A lawyer's failure to fulfill his or her professional
obligation results in varying forms of discipline.' 86
The Model Rules also impose upon lawyers a duty to counsel' 87 and
advocate' 88 for their clients while imposing fiduciary obligations to third-party
non-clients.' 89 In addition to fiduciary responsibilities, examples of a lawyer's
duty to the client include the following: competence in representation, 90a 9 2
defined scope of representation,91 a duty to communicate adequately,'
See Denckla, supra note 122, at 2597. But see Zacharias,supra note 6, at 1522.
See Zacharias,supra note 6, at 1522 (increasing specialization for legal services requires
"increased bar participation in assessing competence within those field [of specialization]").
182
See Wald, supra note 128, at 1043-44 ("Professional ideals capture the core beliefs and
aspirations of the bar, its commitments and goals, as well as its standards and ethical codes of
conduct."). Today's ABA is committed to pursuing four unique goals: to serve its members, to
improve the profession, to eliminate bias and enhance diversity, and advance the rule of law. See
Am. Bar Ass'n, supra note 52.
183
See Zacharias,supranote 6, at 1509.
184 See Ksiazek, supra note 153, at 185 ("Members of other professions who seek to engage in
layperson conveyancing lack such client protections.").
180

181

85

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Pmbl.

1 (2011).

186

See Zacharias,supranote 6, at 1509.

187

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1-2.4 (2011).
Id. at R. 3.1-3.9.

Id. at R. 4.1-4.4.
190
191

Id. at R. 1.1.
Id. at R. 1.2.

192

Id. at R. 1.4.
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confidentiality of information,193 a duty to avoid conflicts of interest in
representation,194 and obligations to prospective clients,19 5 to name a few. The
Rules outline responsibilities in the management of law firms,196 public service
by members of the Bar,' 9 7 communicating information about legal services,198
and measures to maintain the integrity of the profession.' 99 When lawyers'
engagement with an individual or entity rises to the level of becoming a client
or prospective client, certain obligations are imposed under the Client-Lawyer
Relationship.200 At the end of the day, the Model Rules ensure that each lawyer
upholds his or her fiduciary responsibilities justifying lawyers' self-regulation:
client control of representation, communication, competency, confidentiality,
and conflict avoidance. 20'
Membership in an organized bar requires a lawyer's undivided
loyalty-the obligation to represent interests other than simply closing "the
deal" for the lawyer's own financial gain. 2 02 Illustrating the power of the
fiduciary relationship, "Loyalty influences behavior; it impels one to do what,
in the absence of loyalty, one would not do; it changes the moral equation for
deciding on a proper course of action." 203 Without these rules and without some
form of alternative regulation, there is little retribution for acts of disloyalty:
abandoning the client, disclosing confidences, lying to the client, and avoiding
personal responsibility for a client's actions resulting from legal advice. 204
The Model Rules play an integral role in differentiating lawyers from
other professionals practicing in related fields. The Model Rules protect the
rule of law. The Model Rules, as argued in this Note, provide non-quantifiable
value that rebuts reformists' criticisms of the costs of regulation. The Model

'

Id at R. 1.6.
Id. at R. 1.7-1.8.
Id. at R. 1.18.

'

Id

'9

194

at R. 5.1-5.7.

197

Id. at R. 6.1-6.5.

'9

Id. at R. 7.1-7.6.

Id. at R. 8.1-8.5.
Id. at Scope 17.
201
SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. Fox, TRAVERSING THE
ETHICAL MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS,
LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 75 (2d ed. 2008).
202
See SIDNEY G. SALTZ, FROM HANDSHAKE TO CLOSING: THE ROLE OF THE COMMERCIAL
199

200

REAL ESTATE LAWYER XV (2d ed. 2010) ("Not every deal should be made, and not every deal
should be closed.").
203
Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers andLoyalty, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 367,
367 (1992).
204
See id at 369.
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Rules are unique to the practice of law and a necessary condition to a lawyer's
admission to the bar. Other professions lack such critical protections. 20 5
Finally, as shown in the timeline of scholarship from various
recessions, critics' arguments for deregulation established a definite pattern that
sustained through fourteen periods of economic decline. Complete deregulation
failed in each one of these recessions, despite reformists' bold arguments to the
contrary in favor of abolishing unauthorized practice restrictions altogether.
UPL restrictions still exist across America, and historical evidence suggests
that any argument to reform must recede from complete deregulation or must
be bolstered by additional evidence to rebut and distinguish prior unsuccessful
reforms. As applied to the 2007 recession, arguments to reform assert the same
mantras: there is too little access to lawyers, legal services cost too much, and
lay practitioners should be able to practice law. Because critics vocalize the
same arguments in response to the same trigger and for the same purpose to
achieve deregulation, recent criticisms after the 2008 recession will likely yield
the same results.
Certainly, regulations hindering a free-market system impose economic
costs.206 However, legal services are different than other commoditized goods,
and their value cannot be readily calculated.20 7 The protections assured by a
regulated legal system outweigh the benefits of complete deregulation,20 8
because a solid rule of law is necessary in a developed democracy. Organized
bar associations impose professional obligations upon all licensed members,
such as loyalty, that are foundational to the profession and not necessarily
quantifiable in a cost-benefit analysis.209
IV. WHAT THE DEBATE IS REALLY ABOUT: REGULATION AS A STALKING
HORSE

After decades of criticism, perhaps the lack of meaningful legal reform
stems from critics' failure to identify the issues actually driving this debate-is
the problem really regulation? Make no mistake, the law is a profession with
unique ideals and duties that bind each lawyer to a code of ethics in order to
205 See Ksiazek, supranote 153, at 185; see also Denckla, supra note 122, at
2593 (discussing
client protections available only through an organized bar).
206 See Hadfield, supranote 10, at 1717; see also KLEINER, supra note 143, at 3.
207 See Munro, supra note 5, at 234.
208 See Cross, supra note 129, at 680.
209 In the interest of self-disclosure, I am generally against over-arching government
regulation on private industry for interests of privacy, autonomy, and efficiency. However, I
believe the stakes involved in protecting the rule of law are too important, and the provision of
legal services is different than comparing different levels of governmental influence: private
versus bureaucratic governance. Therefore, I offer this defense of UPL restrictions, despite
contrary arguments in this Note, because states have enough autonomy to enact specific lawyer
regulations in respective jurisdictions and UPL restrictions necessarily protect the rule of law.
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protect the rule of law. At the same time, however, law is a business motivated
largely by financial incentives. 21 0 The only check restraining business goals
from engulfing a lawyer's professionalism are the fiduciary obligations that he
or she must uphold in order to practice law at all. Without these obligations, the
rule of law cannot survive.
Regulating legal services through unauthorized practice regimes makes
sense. Industry regulations, generally, are justified when the benefits of
regulation exceed costs imposed by limiting free-market alternatives. 2 1 1
Admittedly, institutionalized regulation is not the most efficient system of
consumer protection for every industry in a free-market society. However, there
is at least a colorable argument supporting tailored regulations for those
industries that, by their very nature, threaten the safety of consumers if
mishandled, corrupted, or abandoned. For example, clean water regulations are
defensible, because water, as a staple of life, is too important to risk a tragedy
of the commons. 212 Nuclear waste regulations are defensible because the effects
of irreparable contamination could devastate communities and threaten lives. 2 13
Likewise, laws governing lawyers are defensible because practitioners
without fiduciary responsibilities have no motivation to protect the rule of law
above personal profit. Entry barriers ensure that licensed lawyers possess a
basic set of skills to protect consumers, and conduct requirements bind lawyers
to a set of ethical obligations to protect the rule of law. Without the risk of
losing one's license, any lawyer not bound by rules of professional
responsibility is free to spout the details of a client's tough divorce,
simultaneously represent opposing litigants, ignore clients' directives, or any
other act destroying confidence in societal order derived from the rule of law.
Above all, the rule of law must be preserved:
The continued existence of a free and democratic society
depends upon recognition of the concept that justice is based
upon the rule of law grounded in respect for the dignity of the
individual and his capacity through reason for enlightened selfgovernment. Law so grounded makes justice possible, for only
through such law does the dignity of the individual attain
respect and protection. Without it, individual rights become

210

See Paul Lippe, Law is Both a Profession and a Business-ForgetThat at Your
Own Peril,
LEGAL
REBELS
(Jan.
27,
2011,
8:34
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/
legalrebels/article/law isboth_ajprofession and a business-forget that at_your own_peril/.
211
See Barton, supra note 176, at 457 (analyzing when industry regulations are justified, e.g.
when the benefits of regulations exceed the costs of regulation).
212
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006).
213
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 10101-10270 (2006).
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subject to unrestrained power, respect for law is destroyed, and
rational self-government is impossible.214
Despite the justification for bar associations' imposition of entrance and
conduct regulations for licensed practitioners, critics still argue for
deregulation.
Commentators argue for deregulating legal services by eliminating
entry regulation and conduct regulations in pursuit of lowering costs and
increasing access.2 15 First, critics question whether or not bar membership
should cede to some less-stringent level of occupational licensing. Economist
Milton Friedman identified three levels of occupational control: registration,
certification, and licensing. 216 Registration is the easiest to justify, because it is
the least intrusive and can serve other social goals such as facilitating taxation
and consumer fraud protection.217 Certification is more difficult to justify,
because the private sector is capable of certifying practitioners without
overarching, organized regulation. 21 8 However, an argument can be made for
certification regimes, because there is little risk of unfair monopolization and
the consumer is still protected by the assurance of quality services.2 19
Commentators further argue that the proper response to inevitable risks of
exploitation and negligence by non-lawyers is regulation, e.g. certification, not
complete prohibition.
Moreover, Friedman fails to find any circumstance where licensing is
justifiable instead of certification. 2 1 Admittedly, licensing benefits the
consumer by ensuring competent legal services and eliminating the information
barrier limiting consumers' inability to discern between good and bad

214
MODEL
CODE
OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY
Pmbl.
(1980),
available
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.authcheckdam.pdf.
215
See Barton, supranote 117, at 1233.
216
See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 144 (2d ed. 1982).
217
Id. Registration is defined by Friedman as follows:
By registration, I mean an arrangement under which individuals are required
to list their names in some official register if they engage in certain kinds of
activities. There is no provision for denying the right to engage in the activity
to anyone who is willing to list his name. He may be charged a fee, either as
a registration fee or as a scheme of taxation.
Id.

at

Id. at 146.
See id. at 147.
220
Rhode, supra note 172, at 1015.
221
FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 149; see also Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The
Petition Clause and Unauthorized PracticeRules, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1515, 1535-45 (1984)
(arguing in favor of certification, instead of licensing, because it is less restrictive and upholds
similar protections of licensing).
218

219
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practitioners. 222 However, licensing, even in the medical context, may not be
justifiable, because professional certification likely satisfies the quality
argument that licensing proponents put forth.223
In addition to adjusting levels of occupational licensing, critics propose
various alternatives to monitor legal services. One alternative relies on marketbased solutions that impose malpractice liability for any harm caused by illequipped practitioners after the fact. 2 24 Another alternative utilizes a case-bycase analysis regarding whether or not a practitioner's services violate statespecific UPL restrictions.2 25 Additionally, some commentators argue for a
legislative alternative based on elected officials establishing a statutory
framework to regulate and enforce practitioner qualifications and consumer
protections. 226
However, these proposals for reform are all irreparably flawed because
each plan imposes yet another layer of regulation without calling it regulation.
Though reform may be accomplished by removing the regulatory power of
independent bar associations, deregulation cannot be achieved by shifting
regulatory authority to government agencies, courts, legislatures, or some other
body that governs the practice of law. Such de facto regulation inevitably
resulting from "deregulation" may even increase restrictions on legal services
by empowering more regulators and industries that lack the unique qualities of
an organized bar.
Undeniably, legal services must be regulated. Proponents must
recognize that legal services impose risks upon unknowing consumers, and
regulation of some sort is inevitable to control practitioners' self-interested
motivations. The question becomes who will regulate-independent bar
associations enforcing licensed lawyers' compliance with ethical duties, or a
system of unorganized, de facto regulators with little continuity?
The organized bar is best suited to regulate legal services for reasons
cited above: justified authority, quality services, inherent protections, and
historical legitimacy. Lawyers are simultaneously privileged with a monopoly
for legal services with the burden of loyalty to their clients, the legal system,

222

See FRIEDMAN, supra note 216, at 147-49, 155-56.

See id. at 154 ("It is easy to demonstrate that quality is only a rationalization and not the
underlying reason for restriction.").
224 See Barton, supra note 117, at 1232-40. Some jurisdictions rely upon deregulation (or
market control) of the unauthorized practice of law, allowing a cause of action with tort remedies
for improper provision of legal services. See generally id. at 1172.
225
See Underwood, supra note 18, at 462-68. The following are questions asked: (1) Is the
legal advice directed to a specific problem of an identifiable person; (2) is the non-lawyer service
reliable; (3) is there potential for a conflict of interest; (4) does the service have the potential to
mislead consumers; and (5) has the non-lawyer addressed confidentiality and privacy concerns?
Id. at 458.
226 See Barton, supra note 117, at 1217.
223
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and the public. 22 7 The monopoly of legal services, however, is not a reciprocal
benefit for lawyers' selflessness. The monopoly of legal services is the source,
not the reason, for lawyers' ability to self-regulate and protect the rule of law in
the interest of others.228 Service to others is at the most foundational level of
what lawyers do.
Moreover, bar associations are the only players well-positioned to
protect the rule of law in the American legal system. For example, truck drivers
have a duty to their employer to deliver goods safely and to refrain from
purposeful injury to others. However, truck drivers have no express obligation
to maintain the roads on which they travel.229
Lawyers, on the other hand, must uphold express duties to clients and
others, while honoring duties to uphold the legal institution. Lawyers, alone,
are uniquely situated with the knowledge to self-regulate and express
obligations to clients, the public, and the courts. Lawyers are members of a
regulated body subject to entrance and conduct requirements to protect the rule
of law-no substantial equivalent currently exists capable of protecting clients,
courts, and the public.
If deregulation fails to satisfy reformists' criticisms of the current
regulatory legal structure, perhaps the real issue is the rising cost of legal
services. As stated previously, commentators argue, "There is far too much law
for those who can afford it and far too little for those who cannot." 230
Alternatively, members of the ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice state
that the cost of legal services is not disproportionate with consumers' costbenefit expectations, where routine legal services are comparable to the cost of
a day at the amusement park.2 3 1 Because regulation is a stalking horse of
reformists' criticisms, the cost of legal services is likely the root of critics'
concerns and an issue that needs exploration beyond the scope of this Note.
V. PLANS FOR REFORM TO PROTECT THE RULE OF LAW

Reform may be inevitable, however. Due to increasing competition and
economic pressure from the recent recession, reforming unauthorized practice
statutes to allow non-lawyers' practice may be unavoidable-if the bar is to

See Wald, supra note 29, at 962.
Id. ("Lawyers qua lawyers benefit from the legal profession's monopoly over the provision
of legal services. In return, lawyers qua lawyers assume responsibility for the law as a public
good and owe a duty to protect it from manipulation. . . ."). In other words, lawyers do not enjoy
a monopoly, because they serve the interests of the people. Instead, because lawyers have a
monopoly, the rule of law is protected by lawyers' ability to self-regulate themselves in the
interest of protecting others.
227

228

229
230

See id. at 961.

Cramton, supra note 45, at 533-34 (citations omitted).
231 See Rhode, supra note 8, at 208.
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maintain its legitimacy as a protective institution, not a self-interested
monopoly.232 Because no regulatory system is infallible under democratic rule,
"Competition in legal services is a fact of life that will not go away. The vast
and growing numbers of lawyers, the entrepreneurial spirit of the American
bar, and the growing responsiveness to consumer desires ensure a highly
competitive milieu for law practice in the 21st century."233 The organized bar
must rise to the occasion and meet its burden of justifying traditional
restrictions in a society of evolutionary legal needs, issues, and competition.234
In order to meet this burden, the costs of restricting practice in the name of
professionalism cannot be rejected entirely, and the merits of practice
restrictions must be balanced against other countervailing forces, e.g. lay
competition.2323 Even Milton Friedman, a vocal critic of occupational licensing,
acknowledges beneficial aspects of licensing despite economic arguments to
the contrary.236
If reform is inevitable, though unidentifiable at this time, two
conditions must be satisfied in order to protect the rule of law. First, a new
system of regulation must balance conflicting interests. On one hand, existing
restrictions fail to recognize the value of competent lay practitioners in certain
areas of legal services.23 7 On the other hand, complete deregulation cannot
occur because "deregulation also fails to differentiate between the types of
legal services lay practitioners can perform competently and those that are best
left to trained attorneys." 23 8 Therefore, imminent reform must achieve some
balance between total restriction and complete deregulation if reform is to be
successful.23 9
Second, any reformation of current unauthorized practice restrictions
should protect clients from lawyer misconduct, provide competent lawyering,
assure fairness in lawyer-client relations, manage increasing pressures from
non-lawyers, provide legal services for the poor, and protect third-persons from
harm, among others. 24 0 The rule of law, critical to the American society, rests
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"Moderation is key to resolving this crisis." Id. at 248. There is a distrust of
the restrictive,
regulated legal profession, where problems of cost and access are exacerbated in poor economies.
On the other hand, complete deregulation likely presents more problems than solutions because
protecting the rule of law and interests of the client and system are too important to risk.
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upon the loyalty and professionalism to which each licensed lawyer is bound.24 1
Without such an obligation, non-lawyers have no obligation, nor repercussions,
for violating ethical rules to which each attorney swears.
Under the current regime, licensed attorneys have a "special
responsibility" for upholding justice.242 To protect the rule of law, lawyers are
bound by rules of professional conduct that require ethical behavior in lawyers'
multiple roles in society: citizen, representative, advocate, and officer of the
court. 243
For example, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct require
three all-encompassing obligations applicable to all circumstances of potential
conflict: a duty to the client, a duty to the legal system, and a duty to the
lawyer's own interest (duty to self).244 Requiring these three prongs of loyalty
are critical to the administration of justice, because these rules serve as a means
of "last resort against the excessive pursuit of self-interest." 24 5 When so many
clients' legal needs have high-stakes in one way or another, arguably it is only
natural that the client's representative thinks of himself when making strategic
decisions about a case. However, lawyers are bound by ethical rules imposing a
duty of loyalty to the client and the legal system, and loyalty is the "fulcrum in
the persistent struggle to define the nature of lawyering.", 24 6
The law is changing. The traditional legal profession of past decades,
bound by restrictive guild-like practice limitations, is evolving into a
"competitive enterprise" due to increasing demand for legal services, increasing
competition by non-lawyers, and increasing technological development
changing the delivery of legal services. 247 Different from previous efforts to
deregulate the practice of law, it seems that reformists may be making progress
towards allowing lay practitioners to practice law. Regulators seem to be
looking more introspectively at perhaps unrealistic restrictions on all non-

See Wald, supra note 29, at 926-27. Wald explains a lawyer's client-centered loyalty:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes to his client, knows in the
discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none
other. To save that client by all expedient means-to protect that client at all
hazards and costs to all others, and amongst others to himself-is the highest
and most unquestioned of his duties; and he must not regard the alarm, the
suffering, the torment, the destruction, which he may bring upon any other.
Id. (citations omitted).
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246
McChrystal, supra note 203, at 367.
241

247

See Posner,supra note 148, at 27.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol115/iss3/14

34

Bush: From the Great Depression to the Great Recession: (Non-)Lawyers P
2013]

FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE GREAT RECESSION

1219

lawyers, 248 and it seems that the ABA recognizes "the dissonance between [its]
traditional regulatory efforts and the reality of the legal world they govern." 2 4 9
At the end of the day, though, no reformist can deny the inherent risks
and stakes involved when providing legal services to clients in need.
Restricting the practice of law to licensed lawyers guarantees a minimum level
of competency, in addition to invaluable ethical obligations that protect the rule
of law foundational to our society. Support for current unauthorized practice
limitations does not eliminate any possibility of future reform, nor does it
ignore the value of reformists' criticisms, discussed above. However, within the
scope of this Note, deregulation and/or loosening UPL enforcement may only
be appropriate when current ethical obligations enforced by the organized bar
are otherwise satisfied: fiduciary duties to clients and courts while also
considering the lawyers' own interests. The rule of law depends on the strength
of these three ethical prongs.
VI. CONCLUSION

When the debate dust settles, economic pressure cannot legitimize
complete deregulation of the American legal system, and unique protections
enforced by an organized bar support the rule of law essential to our society.
Despite unsuccessful attempts to deregulate the law during fourteen prior
recessions, similar arguments resurface today. Critics attack the monopolistic
regulation of legal services because lay practitioners would impose more
competition to decrease prices and increase access to legal services.
Alternatively, supporters of current regulations argue that unauthorized practice
restrictions are justified based upon invaluable protections only a regulated bar
can provide.
At the end of the day, legal services impose risks upon innocent
consumers, and some sort of mechanism is necessary to protect against
manipulative or ill-equipped practitioners. In fact, regulation may not be the
proper debate because any alternative form of monitoring legal services is
simply another form of de facto regulation. Therefore, if the cost of legal
services is crippling those hardest hit by an economic recession, then this is an
entirely different debate.
Regardless of the merits of the current regime, the law governing
lawyers imposes fiduciary duties critical to upholding the rule of law. These
ethical obligations are critical to any reform initiative, if some alternative to
current regulation is to find success at all. As it stands now,

See Zacharias,supra note 6, at 1526.
Id. at 1527 (discussing Multidisciplinary Practice and Multijurisdictional Practice
Commissions).
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[Lawyers owe a] duty to the court, that it shall be assisted by
the advocate; a duty to the adversary, not to push an advantage
beyond the bounds of equity; a duty to truth and right, whose
allegiance no human being can renounce; and a duty to the
state, that it shall not be corrupted by the example of
unscrupulous insincerity.250
In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the "American
aristocracy," in a nation of laws, rests with the attorneys' bar and the judges'
bench. 25 1 Lawyers have unique intellect that sets them apart from other
professions because "they are masters of a necessary science, knowledge of
which is not widespread." 2 52 In 2012, codified rules self-imposed by bar
associations ensure that lawyers maintain superior knowledge of the law in
addition to fiduciary obligations protecting consumers' reliance on quality legal
services.
Together, lawyers' knowledge, abilities, and ethical constraints have
protected the rule of law for centuries. In the next two hundred years, what will
be the role of lawyers? Removing entrance barriers and conduct requirements
likely creates an entirely different legal system. If critics eventually deregulate
legal services completely, perhaps after the next economic recession, some
alternative enforcement mechanism must be in place to control self-interested
practitioners. Otherwise, the impact of untamed "lawyers" would be disastrous.
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